Nicholas Barry

I manage all the interns at my job in Senator Steinberg's office, and have recently implemented a leadership development program called Ownership Initiatives. I'll write more in the future about how the program is going, but it's best to start with the description of the project I wrote, and which I ask our interns to read:

We believe interns should be able to take on projects of interest - what we call "ownership initiatives", because we want interns to take ownership over the projects.

Nick will talk to you about what sorts of initiatives you're interested in. (See some initiative ideas below.) You, he and Susan will meet to talk about which is the most feasible, how best to accomplish it, and what deadlines are reasonable.

Nick will also assign you "core tasks" each day, which you must finish before working on your initiative. These are the tasks that it is important for our office to complete, such as writing response letters, casework, printing certificates, addressing constituent inquiries, and answering the phone. Nick will give you a fixed number of tasks each day, plus a share of any tasks that come in that day (e.g. new cases).

It is expected that you will finish your core tasks in the first part of the day, and then move on to work on your initiative. You should talk to Nick if you are having difficulty accomplishing all your core tasks. It is also expected that you will set feasible goals for your initiative, and accomplish those on schedule.

Read this page, and browse through the list of initiatives below. Think about your own interests and passions, and how they might fit in to various projects.

Talk to Nick about your interests, and mention any projects you've thought of that aren't on the list already. He and other staff will think about what sort of project would be feasible to start with. We'll try to generate several options, at which point you have come to the Investigative phase of the process.

Like most real-world projects, your ownership initiative may not be well-defined from the start. It's possible you'll start working on an existing initiative, but it's equally likely you'll want to start working on a project that doesn't have clear boundaries. A big part of being successful is being able to (1) accept ambiguity, and (2) take actions to bring clarity to your efforts. Even if a project is already well-defined, your role in the project may be initially be vague. To begin your initiative, you'll need to do a bit of investigation and legwork to define the purpose and boundaries of the project, or of your involvement with the project.

You can consult with staff for advice on the investigative phase; here are some general strategies for clarifying your initiative:

1. Talk to the point person on the project - that may be a member of the district staff, capital staff, majority caucus, or even possibly someone else. Ask them lots of questions about the nature of the project and how you can get involved; try to pin them down on lots of details. You should have a very clear understanding of what you'll be doing - try explaining your role to someone else, and if you find difficulty explaining something, you should go back to ask the point person more questions.
2. Call other staff and offices working on the project (ask staff in our office for advice on who to talk to) about how you can help. This is important because you won't always be able to reach your point person immediately. It shows initiative that you're ready to move forward with the project even though your point person hasn't given you specific tasks yet.
3. Do some research on the project, to figure out what else we might be able to do to help the project. This could mean calling a relevant state agency, calling some organizations with expertise in the relevant area, or looking around online for resources. (Talk to staff in our office before calling any outside organizations to find out if there's anything sensitive you shouldn't talk to outsiders about.) From your research, you can make some suggestions to your point person. It's an important skill to be able to anticipate things the project might need, and generate options to choose from.

Some initiatives on the list below, and some initiatives you'll think of, have been dreamed up by interns, or by Nick. If one of these catches your interest, your Investigative phase will be heavy on the research aspect - you'll need to define not only your role in the project, but the project itself.

You'll also have to pitch the project and gain approval for it. For some projects, this will be easy - it isn't hard to get approval to run a tree-planting project in a neighborhood, for example. Other projects will require significant research beforehand before pitching. If you want Darrell to carry a bill, for example, you'll have to do a lot of research, some of which will be necessary before you even float the idea with staff (talk to Nick before embarking on anything).

Potential projects may not be approved, so talk to Nick and other district staff to get advice on how to improve your chances. This shouldn't discourage you from pursuing an initiative of your own design, though. Project proposals in the real world don't all get accepted, either. Even if your proposal isn't accepted, you'll earn the respect of the staff you work with.

In my Intersectoral Leadership class at USC, Professor Callahan asked each of our groups to choose a different article from the readings, analyze it in light of the theory presented by another article, spend 20 minutes planning a presentation, and present to the class.

I asked that our group focus on an article that exhorted the US to stop trying to create democracy in Afghanistan, and focus instead on making government function, while accepting that Afghanistan is hardly a unified state. I was interested because of my own experience teaching science in Afghanistan.

While preparing, Kiyomi, a friend and colleague of mine from Senator Steinberg's office, suggested we try to make our presentation "Sticky." Professor Callahan is a devotee of Malcolm Gladwell (as am I), and encourages us to incorporate insights from his books into our presentations, leadership style, and everyday thinking - which I think is a great idea. Gladwell's "Sticky" concept is something close to how memorable an idea is - how likely someone is to hold on to, and pass along, an idea.

I thought we could easily make our presentation Sticky by incorporating some personal story from my experience in Afghanistan. I thought about what story might be a good illustration of the points in our presentation, and finally thought of an excellent experience from a travel office. So I began our presentation with this story:

"I have gone to Afghanistan twice to teach science, and will never forget my experience there. One thing in particular that I remember is when we walked into a travel office to buy tickets back home. There were clocks on the wall displaying different time zones. The four clocks were labeled Paris, London, Tokyo, and Kabul."

I had drawn a row of four clocks without hands on a presentation pad beforehand, and I continued:

"The hour hands for Paris, London and Tokyo all looked something like this." I drew each, pointing up and to the left.

"The Kabul clock, on the other hand, looked like this," I said, as I drew in Kabul's hour hand, pointing down and to the right - in the opposite direction.

"Afghanistan," I continued, "Is on a different track from us. It isn't a westernized country like Japan or Germany that we can rebuild into a democracy. It's totally different, and we have to accept that when we are doing work there."

At the end of our presentation, Professor Callahan said, "Okay, stop. In my twelve years of doing this exercise, I have never seen so good a first presentation. The way Nick started with that story about his experience in Afghanistan grabbed you, and made you want to know more. Normally, I have the groups present right after each other. But I want all of you to take three to five minutes back with your groups to talk about how you can do what they did to make your presentations Sticky."

My personal story made our presentation stand head and shoulders above other presentations.

This is an essay I wrote for a class on the History of West Africa. (The block quotes are displayed as separate paragraphs, in quotation marks.)

How did the political structures of West African colonies differ from the political structures of pre-modern West African states?

 
Long before any European power came to Africa, there were states and societies with complex political systems and methods for administration.  The powerful ones usually gained wealth at first by monopolizing trade routes passing through their territory.  These states had sophisticated structures for administering their local territory.  In many cases there was a king or sultan, who often had a highly elevated status, which could be seen by his garb and adornments.  Sometimes he was considered divine.  He was surrounded, guided, and restrained by lower chiefs and ministers.

Yet somehow, when Europeans started conquering the states as colonies, they came to the conclusion that Africans were primitive and unsophisticated, and needed help.  The Europeans then made use of existing (African) political structures, which proved themselves not primitive at all, to run the colonies.  Mostly the colonizers centralized power in the hands of the chiefs of the native administration so that these chiefs could better accomplish the tasks given them, like the collection of taxes.

First I consider pre-modern West African states, and the bases of their power.  Then I examine the ways that the states were administered, paying specific attention to the members of the court.  Entirely different methods were used to keep control over vassal states, which I study next.  Finally I briefly go into how succession affects and reflects the other issues a state faces.  Then the European powers decide to take colonies, so I delve into the political structures they encounter, and what they think of these structures.  We next take a look at how the Europeans ran their colonies.  Why did they choose not to rule directly, and what was the nature of their indirect rule?  Europeans made very good use of intermediaries.  They also centralized power around the native chiefs.  Finally, we will look at how, once again, the issue of succession somewhat reflects the issues facing the colonizers.

A list of my secondary sources can be found at the end of this paper.  I usually did not quote from these books, but have attempted to use footnotes when a particular idea or phrase comes directly from one of these sources.  I have also used primary sources from West African History by Robert O. Collins, and from Ancient Ghana and Mali by Nehemia Levtzion.  These sources are from different times and different locations, including Antonius Malfante, writing from Tawat, to Lord Lugard, who founded the British principle of Indirect Rule.

There were a number of different types of political forms in Africa before European contact.  There were empires like Ghana and Mali, which were different than the city-states of the Hausa, both of which were different from the stateless, acephalous communities, such as the Grunshi or Birifor.  There are a number of shared features, especially among the “cephalous” societies – among the societies with chiefs or similar such central (though not absolute) rulers.  Many cities, states and empires gained wealthby regulating and monopolizing trade.1  Antonius Malfante wrote from Tawat, an oasis in the Sahara, through which passed important trade from the Hausa city-states to Air.  Tawat was divided into quarters, each of which was controlled by a local ruler.

"Everyone arriving here places himself under the protection of one of these rulers, who will protect him to the death: thus merchants enjoy very great security, much greater, in my opinion, than in kingdoms such as Themmicenno [Tlemcen] and Thunisie [Tunis].  [Antonius Malfante, as printed in Collins 24; Brackets in original]"

The rulers protect traders, and in return they collect fees from the merchants.  Levtzion, in The Early States of Western Sudan, explains that “Sahil is the Arabic word for ‘a shore’, which is well understood if the desert is compared to a sea of sand, and the camel to a ship.  Hence the towns which developed in the Sahil—Takrur, Ghana, and Gao—may be regarded as ports” (Levtzion, Early States 131).  Tawat, inside the Sahara, would thus be regarded as an island at which you can stock up on supplies during your trip across the ocean of the Sahara.  It was convenient for traders; it would have been convenient for local elites, too, who could earn money from the trade passing through.  Ghana, located on the Sahel, and on two trans-Saharan trade routes, had a similar opportunity to tax traders.  At first Ghana earned money by regulating and taxing regional trade, and later by taxing the developing trans-Saharan trade.  More extensive states were desirable in order to better control trade, and the money earned from regulation and taxation enabled the development of such states.  Stronger states allowed not only for better control of trade, but also for better protection, which encouraged trade still more.

There were other sources of wealth for a state or empire.  Ghana, for example, had access to gold fields, and it taxed the mining of gold.  States were also founded on agricultural surplus.  The Hausa city-states of Kano and Katsina, for example, became wealthy because of agricultural and crafts developments, and only after they were already wealthy did they attract large trade flows.  Non-trade taxation was also a very important revenue stream for a state.  Leo Africanus describes the taxes in the town and kingdom of Gago:

"They are continually burthened with grieuous exactions, so that they haue scarce any thing remaining to liue vpon.  [Leo Africanus, as printed in Collins 30]"

Gago collects these taxes from its people, and from the sound of it, the taxes form quite a revenue stream.  He also describes the taxes in the kingdom of Bornu:

"They paye vntu him none other tribute but the tithes of all their corne: neither hath this king any reuenues to maintaine his estate, but ouely such spoiles as he getteth from his next enimes by often inuasions and assaults.  [Leo Africanus, as printed in Collins 31]"

This is somewhat different from Gago, which imposes a high level of taxes.  Bornu is based much more on raids on neighboring states and regions than it is on taxation of its people.

In more hierarchical societies, local rulers collected taxes and kept a portion, sending on the rest to the central authority.  The Hausa had an interesting way of gaining revenue.  Their government was made up of titled offices, the most important of which were given to members of important lineages.  As the governments of the city-states became more complex, though, more offices were created; commoners could fill these offices, but had to pay for the privilege.  There were many different other types of fees.  It often cost money to be heard by the king or in court.  Chiefs did not always get rich, though.  Elliot Skinner says that a village or district chief among the Mossi

"was seldom wealthy, because he always had to use his revenue to fulfill unexpected obligations toward his subjects, his superiors in the political hierarchy, and his household.  [Elliot Skinner as printed in Engelbert 15]"

He was expected to be generous and take care of the needs of visitors, newcomers, messengers, and his own large family, and was responsible for providing for his villages in the case of a famine.

The chief, king, emperor or sultan did not have absolute power.  He was aided by ministers, members of court, and sub-chiefs, but his power was also limited by them.  Ibn Battuta witnessed one such occurrence when visiting the Sultan of Mali.  The Sultan was angry with his chief wife, Qasa (“the Queen”), and threw her in prison.

"The people talked about it, and disapproved of his actions…The chiefs [also] spoke in Qasa’s favour, and so the king assembled them in the audience chamber, and Dugha [the linguist] said on his behalf: ‘You have said much in favour of Qasa, but she committed a capital crime.’  [Ibn Battuta, as printed in Levtzion, Ancient Ghana and Mali 67]"

The Sultan then went on to show that Qasa had been planning his overthrow, and only then do the chiefs agree to her death.  The Sultan had to account to his chiefs and, to some extent, to the people.  In the Hausa city-states, also, the king had limited power.  There was one particularly important titled office, called the Magajiya, which was always held by the official queen mother.2  She had various powers, including the ability to recommend to the council that the king be removed from office.  She alone among all the other ministers did not have to swear allegiance to the king, and she could not be removed from office by the king.  She acted as a powerful check on his authority.  In the kingdom of Mali, a weak king on the throne threatened the entire empire.  In such a case a powerful court official would intervene, either making the king into his puppet, or taking the throne by force.  No matter the method, the ruler had far from absolute power.

There were ways, though, that a king could increase his power.  He often won over the favor of his chiefs by giving them gifts, slaves or even villages.  In the Hausa city-states, when several people were vying for an important office, the king could create debts by granting the office.  The Mossi king had a similar method; he could appoint a nakombse (descendant of a warrior and thus in line for chieftaincy) who had lost his naam (right to rule) to some important position.  This appointed official would owe his position wholly to the king and so would be loyal.

The king could also increase his power by appointing slaves to important positions.  Slaves were ideal because they were low in status and would therefore owe the king a debt for lifting them up in society.  The king of Mali, Mansa Musa, found them especially useful because through them he could decrease his dependency on his family ties; the slaves would be loyal to him alone, not to his lineage.  Kings of Mali in general appointed them to some of Mali’s provinces to act as governor, to keep an eye on the vassal state.  In Songhay slaves often ran farms and the chief slave, after delivering a quota of foodstuffs to the central government, was allowed to keep the surplus.  Many slaves grew rich this way and so supported the system.  The Hausa found slaves to be particularly useful.  Attacks from nearby enemies necessitated the creation of more offices for military chiefs.  But these chiefs often grew powerful enough to rebel against the Hausa city-state.  Slaves were appointed to fill these positions more loyally.  Leo Africanus describes a very specific use for eunuchs in Gago:

"The king of this region hath a certaine priuate palace wherein he maintaineth a great number of concubines and slaues, which are kept by eunuches…[Leo Africanus, as printed in Collins 29-30]"

For obvious reasons a eunuch would not present the threat to the king’s harem that other slaves would pose.  The strategy of appointing eunuchs to watch over a harem was widespread through the kingdoms of West Africa.

Besides their own local area, many kingdoms, states or empires had vassal states.  From these they extracted tribute in the form of money, goods, soldiers, or slaves.  Leo Africanus described it thus:

"Izchia [Askiya Muhammad, 1493-1538—ed.] subdued the prince of this region, and made him his tributarie, and so oppressed him with greeuous exactions, that he was scarce able to maintaine his family.  [Leo Africanus, as printed in Collins 28]"

Askiya Muhammad made the prince a vassal, and extracted a heavy tribute on threat of another invasion.

The conquering state used different methods to keep their vassals from rebelling or breaking away.  Most bound the vassal state only very loosely to the central state.  Chiefs paying tribute retained autonomy; the Hausa, for example, paid tribute to Bornu, but were otherwise autonomous.  Loosely-bound vassal states were more likely to rebel at the first sign of weakness.  There was always the threat of military action if the tributary state failed to pay, but a weakened state would not be able to make this threat credible.  Mali, for example, only controlled Tadmekka when headed by powerful kings (Levtzion, Ancient Ghana and Mali 78).  Leo Africanus records an example of such a threat from the kingdom of Tombuto:

"They haue often skirmishes with those that refuse to pay tribute, and so many as they take, they sell vnto the merchants of Tombuto.  [Leo Africanus, as printed in Collins 29]"

Tombuto carried out its threat against vassals that did not pay, and sold those captured into slavery.  This would convince other vassal states to continue paying.  Ibn Khaldun describes another instance of invasion:

"Later the authority of Ghana waned and its power declined whilst that of the veiled people, their neighbours on the north next to the lands of the Berbers, increased.  The latter overcame the Sudanese, plundered their territories, imposed upon them tribute, and converted many of them to Islam.  [Ibn Khaldun, as printed in Levtzion, Ancient Ghana and Mali 52]"

We see Ghana on the decline, and the “veiled people” on the rise.  These veiled people have taken the Sudanese as vassals, and imposed tribute, which is a common way of extracting money since it is easier than trying to assess a tax.  They have also converted the vassal states to Islam, which may help keep them in line. 

Another strategy states used was to take the sons of the rulers of vassal states hostage.  Mali kept the sons of the ruler of Songhay.  This is described by Abt-al-Rahman al-Sadi:

"When the two children [Ali Kolon and Salman-Nari] were old enough to enter the service, the Sultan of Mali took them with him.  At that time, in fact, these princes were his vassals, and the prevailing custom dictated that the sons of kings were compelled to serve their sovereign.  [Abd-al-Rahman al-Sadi, as printed in Collins 32]"

The kings would be less interested in revolting or even holding back on payment, knowing that their sons were in the hands of their suzerain.  Ali Kolon and his brother, however, managed to escape the grasp of the Sultan of Mali, and made it back home where they successfully rebelled against the Sultan.  So this was not a completely successful way of binding vassal states.

There were many other ways of trying to prevent vassal states from breaking away.  The King of Tombuto offered peace to a fleeing prince:

'In my time this region was conquered by the king of Tombuto, and the prince thereof fled into the deserts, whereof the king of Tombuto hauing intelligence, and fearing least the prince would returne with all the people of the deserts, granted him peace, conditionally that he should pay a great yeerely tribute vnto him, and so the said prince hath remained tributarie to the king of Tombuto vntill this present.  [Leo Africanus, as printed in Collins 28]"

The king, knowing that this prince might come back to fight in the future, offered peace, and gained a tributary rather than an enemy.  Mali held onto some of its vassal states even in the face of instability by colonizing them with Malinke.  The king of Bornu killed all the warriors in the land of Barak, so that Barak would not easily be able to rebel.  Many times the leader of a vassal state was asked to swear allegiance to the new ruler.  The Sarkin Kano lived in one province he conquered to consolidate it.  Sarki Sulimanu split up one troublesome province into two to prevent it from rebelling.

When the ruler of a powerful state died, the degree to which vassal states were bound to that state became very important.  Times of succession would often be times of crisis for a state.  In a way, succession was a microcosm of the issues faced by the state.  A state with loosely-bound vassal states might lose much of its revenue when vassals dropped away, or even disintegrate if the vassals attacked.  If ministers and members of court were powerful, many of them would grab for power.  If, on the other hand, vassal states were tightly bound and there were clear laws or customs for succession, the state would have only minor problems.  During one of Mali’s succession disputes, its provinces seceded, Mossi attacked, and Songhai finally filled the power vacuum left by Mali’s deflation.  Ghana had no law of fixed succession, and its administrative capability never caught up to its military exploits; during one succession it was attacked from without and within, and it collapsed.  Asante, on the other hand, was very tightly knit and kept the death of its ruler secret until a new ruler was chosen.  Successions were not nearly as problematic for Asante.

 

Upon penetrating the West African coast, Europeans did not frequently came across familiar forms of political organization.3  The would-be colonizers concluded that the natives were primitive and inferior, and needed European guidance.  When the Europeans decided to take the heavy burden of self-rule off the shoulders of the primitive Africans, though, they did not end up taking off much weight.  They had to rule indirectly, through existing political structures and intermediaries.  The colonizers centralized power in the hands of the native chiefs (or sometimes created chiefs altogether) to make rule over African colonies easier.

Throughout West Africa there were many stateless societies; these societies had no ruler or chief other than the head of each family or clan.  A village containing multiple families might have a group of elders that made decisions, but there was no paramount ruler.  C. H. Armitage, the British Chief Commissioner for the Northern Territories, writes:

"Col. P. F. Whittall D.S.O. held a meeting at Kwouchoggo of all the Issalla chiefs with a view to finding out whether there was any real hereditary chief of the Issallas.  All chiefs gave the same statement:- viz. that before the white man came there were no Issalla chiefs.  [C. H. Armitage, as printed by Mendonsa 362]"

These societies had had no rulers, which clearly confused the Europeans.  Sometimes the Europeans found societies that did have chiefs, but the chiefs did not meet the expectations of the colonizers.  Dr. William Ryan, the District Commissioner (1913-14), wrote of the chief of Sekai, a Sisala village:

"Sekai is an old man clad in a short shirt which is filthy dirty.  He has absolutely no attributes of a chief: No appearance: Dirty: No wives: No personal possessions: No authority… [Dr. William Ryan, as printed in Mendonsa 359]"

The colonizers expected to find a political structure somewhat similar to their own hierarchical one, and upon failing to find such structures, they concluded that the Africans were not advanced enough to have developed such political forms.

With the attitude that the Africans were primitive and unsophisticated, the Europeans decided that they could benefit the Africans by bringing order.  Lord Lugard envisioned

"powers which rightly belong to the controlling Power as trustee for the welfare of the masses, and as being responsible for the defence of the country and the cost of its central administration… [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 232]"

Lugard, among others, felt that the Europeans had a responsibility to look out for the welfare of their colonies, and he seemed certain that they would not be able to look out for themselves.

The colonies were not administered directly by Europeans, however, for a number of reasons.  It would have been impractical to try to rule directly, as Lugard explains:

"the British staff, exercising direct rule, cannot be otherwise than very small in comparison to the area and population of which they are in charge.  [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 236]"

To administer a state requires a large number of people, Lugard goes on to explain, such as police and couriers, as well as special government employees who make sure that others are working hard and meeting standards.  There were simply not enough Europeans in Africa to rule directly.  In addition to this practical reason, there was an ideological reason not to rule directly, according to Lugard:

"To abandon the policy of ruling them through their own chiefs, and to substitute the direct rule of the British officer, is to forgo the high ideal of leading the backward races, by their own efforts, in their own way, to raise themselves to a higher plane of social organization... [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 236]"

Ruling through the native chiefs, in other words, will give the poor, uneducated Africans a chance to experience and learn from a true system of governance, which will greatly benefit these Africans.

The indirect rule of the colonizers consisted mostly of taking advantage of existing power structures.4  Lugard explained that existing emirates or tribes should not be broken up into different administrative units (Collins 229).  He also advocated taking control of native states:

"Comparatively little difficulty…would be experienced in the application of such a system to Moslem States, for even if their rulers had deteriorated, they still profess the standards of Islam, with its system of taxation, and they possess a literate class capable of discharging the duties I have described.  [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 231]"

He says that non-Muslim states with tax-systems can just as easily be used.  In either case it is easier for the British to collect taxes through the native leaders than to do it themselves.  The French used existing Mossi government functions for collecting taxes and for recruiting men for corvee labor and conscription (Englebert 21).

The principle of indirect rule is built upon intermediaries who know African society, and can interact with Europeans.  British administrators relied heavily on Wangrin (The Fortunes of Wangrin, Ba); Lord Lugard lists some various ways intermediaries are important to colonial rule.

"The district headman, usually a territorial magnate with local connections, is the chief executive officer in the area under his charge.  [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 229]"

It was important for a part of the administration be made up natives with connections and an understanding of West African society; it made sense to give such a person the ability to make certain decisions.  Lugard also explains that the Fulani, not conquered, were conquerors themselves, and that some fear they will always chafe under British rule.  But he explains that

"there be now doubt that such races form an invaluable medium between the British staff and the native peasantry…Their traditions of rule, their monotheistic religion, and their intelligence enable them to appreciate more readily than the negro population the wider objects of British policy.  [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 233]"

They, unlike the masses, apparently, will be able to sympathize with the British and be effective rulers because of this.  Furthermore,

"Their close touch with the masses—with whom they live in daily intercourse—mark them out as destined to play an important part in the future, as they have done in the past, in the development of the tropics.  [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 233-4]"

Since they are in such close contact with the masses, and have actually become inextricable from these masses, as Lugard explains, they are ideal intermediaries since they understand African society extremely well.

One more advantage noted by Lugard is the fact that native rulers, being much more in tune with the movements in society, will notice any attempted rebellion.  He explains that

!the personal interests of the rulers must rapidly become identified with those of the controlling Power…the rulers soon recognise that any upheaval against the British would equally make an end of them.  [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 234]"

Lugard recognizes that the Europeans have given legitimization to the native rulers, and this legitimization will diminish if the Europeans leave.5  He writes that the Fulani Emir in Nigeria helped the British put down the numerous “Mahdi” with fanatical followings.

In order to be able to rule effectively, the Europeans needed native administrators who could carry out orders completely.  Europeans therefore needed to increase the powers of the native chiefs.  Lugard writes:

"The object in view is to make each “Emir” or paramount chief, assisted by his judicial Council, an effective ruler over his own people.  [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 229]"

Each paramount chief needs to have a certain amount of power and responsibility; mostly he needs to be obeyed by those below him.  Lugard says an important step is to

"induce those who acknowledge no other authority than the head of a family to recognize a common chief.  [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 238]"

It is necessary to impose chiefs, in other words, where they do not already exist.  The French also imposed chiefs on stateless societies.  Having a subordinate, native chief with executive powers was important for the rule of the colony.

European control over the succession of native leaders is interesting in that it is fairly representative of the whole of European rule in West Africa.  Lugard writes that in principle the governor has the right to confirm, deny or choose new successors for native rulers.  But in reality,

"Succession is governed by native law and custom…It is important to ascertain the customary law and to follow it when possible, for the appointment of a chief who is not the recognised heir, or who is disliked by the people, may give rise to trouble… [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 235]"

It is found convenient to follow native law when it works well.  Lugard finds, for example, that some Moslem countries maintain two rival dynasties and rulers are chosen from each in alternation (Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 235).  As with all of colonial administration, the colonial power has the right to make all decisions, but finds it useful to allow the indigenes to make some of their own decisions.  Furthermore, the colonial power often finds that existing structures solve problems quite well.  There is even a further parallel between succession and colonial administration; Lugard writes:

"The formal approval of the Governor after a short period of probation is a useful precaution, so that if the designated chief proves himself unsuitable, the selection may be reversed without difficulty.  [Lord Lugard, as printed in Collins 236]"

This is an excellent example of colonial paternalism.  As with administration of the colonies, the Europeans felt they can make the best decisions in most things and want to keep power in their own hands.

The West African states prior to contact with Europeans took on a wide variety of political forms.  They usually became strong through taxation of trade and nearby natural resources, then through demanding tribute from conquered vassal states.  They administered themselves with intermediate chiefs and ministers with some power and ability to check the ruler; slaves were also very important in the administration of most West African states.  Vassal states were usually bound weakly to the suzerain, and broke away in times of internal dispute, although there were many different strategies used by the conquering state to hold on to wayward vassals.  Succession was often a time of weakness, and reflected many of the issues facing the state.

Upon contact, things did not change dramatically or immediately, since the Europeans had to make use of existing political structures to run their colonies, due to their own small numbers.  They did change some things, though, by implementing a systematic tax system and by centralizing power in the hands of the native chiefs.  Finally, we see that succession was important and reflective of the issues facing the colonizers, just as it was with the pre-contact states.

 

Footnotes:

1. Mendonsa, Levtzion, Engelbert and others mention that in Europe, feudalism arose because of the fertility and scarcity of land; lords gained power and wealth by controlling land.  In Africa people are spread out, and the land is both plentiful and delicate.  Thus control of land is not worth as much and control of people is not easy since people can easily move elsewhere to find better working conditions.  Trade, therefore, is the easiest to control.
2. She was never the biological mother of the king; she was instead a senior member of the powerful lineages.
3. I.e. a hierarchical form of society.
4. The French claimed to rule directly, but they were forced to use indirect rule for the same reason the British had to: insufficient Europeans in Africa.  Both the French and the British used native power structures to administer, though the French tended to alter these structures dramatically.
5. His statement is not merely conjecture; other British administrators noted that when they left for World War I, Africans stopped obeying the native rulers.

Thursday was the first day of my Intersectoral Leadership class at USC. One excellent thing about the program I'm in is that we do lots of activities that force us to experience the concepts we're learning about. The Dominoes and Poker Chips game created a really interesting leadership dynamic I hadn't ever witnessed before - there was an abrupt shift, before which we were operating as separate teams, and after which the whole class was unified, and I was surprised to find everyone listening to me.

So on Thursday morning, Professor Callahan began stacking dominoes and three colors of poker chips on the front table. He explained to our five table groups that we were going to play a game.

Each one of us would start with two random poker chips. Our objective was to be holding a domino when one minute was up, and we could trade chips for dominoes. Here were the trading rules:

1. You may trade three chips of different colors for one domino; you will also get one chip (of your choosing) back.
2. You may trade three dominoes for seven chips (of your choosing) back.
3. No stealing from other players
4. Anyone who does not have a domino in hand when time was called was dead.

He gave us two minutes to strategize. I was concerned people at our table would be competitive between each other, and quickly suggested that we all pool our chips to make some quick trades. I figured if we could convert our chips into three dominoes, then convert those back into more chips, we could convert our remaining chips back into four dominoes, and we'd all be set.

I don't know what other tables planned, but when he called for trading to begin, his table was mobbed. Everyone was calling for him to make exchanges for them. I had offered to be the trading rep for our table, and we got as far as our three dominoes, and exchanged them back into chips, when he called time. We had no dominoes; all of us were dead.

We all returned to our seats, and Professor Callahan counted the total number of dominoes throughout the whole class.  Only four people had dominoes out of a class of 21.

He reset the starting conditions (he took all the dominoes, and gave us each two chips), and asked us to take some time to plan again. We figured that, given the short amount of time, we should just hold on to our three dominoes and settle for one of us dying. I volunteered for that part, since I had proposed our plan, and knew I had to be willing to sacrifice, or they would distrust my call for everyone to contribute their chips.

We pulled this off, but at the end, the whole class only had seven survivors. We had done better, but no one else had. It still wasn't a very satisfactory result.

In the next planning session, and at the suggestion of one of my group members, I suggested to a group on one side that we could jointly pool our chips. They weren't interested, however, so we decided to stick with our original strategy - to no better success.

In the next planning session, Leila suggested again that we might want to coordinate with other groups, so the two of us approached two other groups that we had seen making plans together. I started talking to one of the two groups, and the other of the two started walking toward me to hear what I was saying. As the two groups converged on Leila and I, I raised my voice to be heard by both groups.

"We can all join our chips into one big pool," I began.

And in that moment, I noticed something strange and incredible. Suddenly the whole class was silent, listening to what I was saying. Everyone, including the group that hadn't been interested the round before, was suddenly a single group instead of separate pieces. There was a complete phase change, like ice cubes melting into a pool of water - a qualitative change in the nature of the group. The speed with which it happened was unlike anything I had ever seen in my life.

I don't know what exactly caused it. I'm sure it was a combination of factors:

• Everyone was frustrated, and were ready for someone who could propose a solution
• Other groups had been testing out the idea of coordinating, and were ready to try it on a larger scale when someone suggested it
• And we shouldn't underestimate the importance of someone speaking clearly and confidently - as Professor Callahan likes to say, a leader brings clarity.

We were sharing now, and everyone agreed to pool their chips, bring them to the front, and several of us would be in charge of making exchanges from chips into dominoes. We would immediately pass the dominoes back to others. When the time was up, Professor Callahan counted our dominoes. We had 9 - one fewer than we had had the previous round.

I sat down, frustrated, but fortunately was not allowed to give up, because immediately the de facto ambassadors for two other groups came over to me to figure out how we could improve. The game wasn't over, and our temporary setback didn't mean we had failed.

We planned again, refining and streamlining our process for assembling chips into piles. When we tried again, we earned 14 dominoes. The round afterward, we reached 17, and in our seventh round, we all had dominoes.

Afterward we reflected, as a class. Professor Callahan reflected that we had done relatively well (though not extraordinarily well) in terms of the number of rounds we needed to all get dominoes. He noted that every group sees a dip when it first joins as a group (which is pretty common for adopting any new strategy, not just in this game), which is discouraging, but that usually the drop is much more significant.

We also observed that once we had our strategy in place, a large number of people chose to be helpful by getting out of the way, and not clogging up the table area. Not everyone can be a leader; Professor Callahan talked about what he calls "followership," or the skill of being a good follower (even though you might also have the capacity to be a good leader), to allow things to get done. Too many cooks spoil the soup.

I noted that the task might have been significantly harder if, at the end of each round, Professor Callahan had totaled the score of each table, rather than of the entire group. We were already split into table groups, and totaling the scores in that way would have set us against each other even more.

At the end of the exercise, Professor Callahan told us to each keep our dominoes. Mine is now sitting on my desk, to remind me of that moment when we became one.